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Abstract 
 
Unilateral coercive measures are condemned by the UN General Assembly on 
a yearly basis for being contrary to international law and for having negative 
effects on human rights and the economy of developing States. Although legal 
doctrine generally finds that the limitations of economic coercion are a grey 
area of international law, these resolutions could be indicative of an emerging 
prohibition. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it would appear that they do not 
satisfy the required criteria – as developed by international jurisprudence – for 
establishing a new custom. That being said, the resolutions clearly illustrate a 
divide between developed and developing States on the legitimacy of 
unilateral sanctions that should not be dismissed. In the interests of 
understanding how this division came into existence and how we can 
overcome it, the article proceeds to address the social factors that lead to its 
creation. 
 
I. Introduction 
1. In June 2016, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation 
issued a joint declaration on the Promotion of International Law, whereby they 
expressed the view that “unilateral coercive measures not based on 
international law, also known as ‘unilateral sanctions’”, are an example of 
double standards and of the “imposition by some States of their will on other 
States” which are excluded under the “generally recognized principles and rules 
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of international law”.1 Such measures, they argue, “can defeat the objects and 
purposes of measures imposed by the Security Council, and undermine their 
integrity and effectiveness”.2 Prior to this declaration, in April 2014, the foreign 
ministers of China, Russia and India issued a similar statement, emphasizing, 
inter alia, that the “imposition of unilateral coercive measures not based on 
international law” is excluded by the principles of sovereign equality of States, 
non-intervention and cooperation. 3  Also in 2014, the Asian African Legal 
Consultative Organization (AALCO) expressed “its profound concern that the 
imposition of unilateral sanctions on third parties is violation of the United 
Nations Charter and in contradiction with the general principles of 
international law […]”.4 
 2. These statements touch upon issues regarding the legality of unilateral 
sanctions, which has been a recurring theme within the United Nations (UN) 
arena as well as an on-going debate in legal doctrine. Indeed, not only do there 
appear to be difficulties defining economic coercion, commentators struggle to 
demonstrate that unilateral coercive measures (UCM) are prohibited under 
international law. Nevertheless, economic coercion is frequently evoked in 
General Assembly (GA) resolutions, whereby developing States contest the 
legality of unilateral sanctions, arguing that they constitute an act of coercion 
contrary to the principles of international law.5 This led Special Rapporteur on 
the negative effects of UCM on the enjoyment of human rights, Idriss Jazairy, 
to question “whether the multiplicity of UN resolutions adopted on such 
measures does not signal an emerging customary international law or 
peremptory norm calling into question” resort to unilateral sanctions.6 
                                                     
1  The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 
China on the Promotion of International Law (25 June 2016) 
(http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698), para. 6. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Joint Communiqué of the 14th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 
Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China 
(19 April 2016) 
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1356652.s
html),  para.6. 
4  AALCO, Extraterritorial Application of National Legislation: Sanctions 
Imposed against Third Parties (2014) 
(www.aalco.int/53rdsession/extraterritorial%202014.pdf), 22. 
5  See, e.g., Pierre-Emmanuel Dupont, Countermeasures and Collective Security: 
The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran, 17:3 Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law (2012), 316-317. 
6  HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral 
coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Idriss Jazairy, 
A/HRC/30/45 (10 August 2015), hereafter “Report of the SR”, para. 47.  
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 3. These resolutions include those entitled Human rights and unilateral 
coercive measures, expressing concern on the negative impact UCM have on 
human rights and, inter alia, urging “all States to cease adopting or 
implementing any unilateral measures not in accordance with international law 
[…]”. 7  Though they are not quoted in the Special Rapporteur’s report, 
reference can also be made to the resolutions on Unilateral economic measures as a 
means of political and economic coercion against developing countries, which call for the 
elimination of unilateral economic sanctions. 8  Unilateral sanctions can be 
adopted by groups of States but they are to be distinguished from multilateral 
sanctions, as they are not adopted by an international or regional organization 
against a Member State on the basis of the multilateral organization’s 
constitutive act. The term therefore excludes sanctions adopted by the UN 
Security Council or by the African Union against their respective Member 
States pursuant to their respective constituent instruments. 9  However, 
restrictive measures adopted by the European Union (EU) against non-
Member States are considered to be UCM.10 
 4. Although sanctions are generally considered to be part and parcel of a 
State’s right to conduct its trade relations freely, official statements, UNGA 
resolutions and Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy’s report indicate that an 
important number of States are opposed to acts of economic coercion and that 
there is a call for such practice to cease, or at the very least for the 
implementation of a regulatory framework. To what extent do these debates 
within the UN and the adopted resolutions provide insight on an issue that has 
stumped doctrine? Are they, as suggested by Idriss Jazairy, indicative of an 
emerging prohibition? 
 5. Against this background, we seek to shed light on the UN debate 
regarding UCM. The first step comprises an attempt at assessing the value of 
the legal claims pertaining to unilateral sanctions; the second step aims at 
understanding the underlying political and social factors that contribute to the 
construction of these claims. Concretely, we begin by assessing the state-of-the-
art on unilateral economic coercion, where we find that the topic remains a 
grey area of international law (Part II). Following these considerations, we turn 
to the UNGA resolutions and the debates thereon in an attempt to determine 
whether or not they constitute, in Special Rapporteur Jazairy’s words, an 
emerging prohibition (Part III). It would however appear that the texts do not 
satisfy the required criteria for establishing a new customary rule; not only is 
the language of the resolutions vague, the debate is heavily divided between 
                                                     
7  GA Res 71/193 (20 January 2017), Operative clause 1. 
8  GA Res 70/185 (22 December 2015), Operative clause 2. 
9  Report of the SR, above n 6, 5, para. 14.  
10  Ibid, 5, para. 15. 
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developed and developing States, bringing the discussions to a stalemate to the 
extent that it is difficult to draw legal conclusions. 
 6. Nonetheless, by broadening the analysis to include the social factors 
that lead to the creation of the deadlock (Part IV) we hope to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of a problem that is, in reality, fundamental to 
international law11 and uncover the underlying issues related to discussions on 
unilateral coercion. As Hirsch writes, a “sociological analysis of international 
legal issues broadens our understanding of social factors involved in the 
formation […] of international law”,12 and hence the construction of States’ 
legal arguments. Indeed, it is apparent that the debate is strongly influenced by 
political considerations and social factors, such as States’ sense of identity and 
the ethical norms they seek to uphold in the international community. The 
discussion on the legality of UCM is indicative of the issues pertaining to these 
measures’ legitimacy. In our conclusion we will seek to open the debate to 
venues of discussion in an effort to overcome the deadlock (Part V). 
II. The current scope of the prohibition of unilateral coercion in doctrine 
and jurisprudence 
7. Acts of economic coercion are first and foremost foreign policy tools upon 
which the international legal order seeks to impose restrictions. Inasmuch as 
these acts involve forms of pressure whereby one State seeks to compel 
another into behaving in a certain manner,13 international law establishes which 
                                                     
11  On the importance of the problem see Daniel Joyner, United Nations 
Counter-Proliferation Sanctions and International Law, in: Larissa van den 
Herik (ed), Research Handbook on U.N. Sanctions and International Law 
(2017) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2752623), 2 
12  Moshe Hirsch, An Invitation to the Sociology of International law (2015), 2. 
He also observes that ‘sociological examination may also suggest some better 
legal mechanisms for […] enhancing compliance with international law’, 
which is the stated aim of unilateral coercive measures by the States that adopt 
them (see below Parts III.A and IV.A). 
13  See, e.g. Lowenfeld’s definition of economic coercion as “measures of an 
economic – as contrasted with diplomatic or military – character taken to 
induce [a target State] to change some policy or practices or even its 
governmental structure”, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law 
(2008), 698. See also Natalino Ronzitti, Sanctions as instruments of coercive 
diplomacy: an international legal perspective, in: Natalino Ronzitti (ed.) 
Coercive diplomacy, sanctions and international law (2016), 1: “Coercion may 
assume various forms that have in common the will of a State to force another 
State into taking particular action”. 
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forms of pressure are permissible and under which circumstances.14  From a 
legal perspective, it is necessary to provide a definition of economic coercion 
where these boundaries are clearly outlined. Yet, not only is defining the 
concept a difficult exercise,15 identifying unlawful economic coercion remains a 
legal grey area.16 By way of illustration, the International Law Commission’s 
(ILC) commentary to Article 18 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
(DASR), which deals with “Coercion of another State”, does not outline the 
legal boundaries of coercion. Instead, the Commentaries equate coercion to 
force majeure: “the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, 
beyond the control of the State”.17 Coercion is defined as “conduct which 
forces the will” of the targeted State, “giving it no effective choice but to 
comply with the wishes of the coercing State”.18 The ILC goes on to say that 
“coercion for the purpose of article 18 […] is not limited to unlawful coercion” 
                                                     
14  Christopher C. Joyner, Coercion, Max Planck Encyclopedia Public 
International Law (hereafter “MPEPIL”) (2006), 
(http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1749?rskey=fpJKgW&result=1&prd=EPIL), para. 1. For 
instance, the use of force as a coercive act is now prohibited unless the UN 
Security Council has authorized it or if the operation is taken in self-defence 
pursuant to UN Charter Article 51. Acts of retorsion and countermeasures are 
considered lawful under customary international law. The latter have been 
codified in the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001) (hereafter 
DASR) Articles 22, 49-53, see Annex to GA Res 56/83 ‘Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (28 January 2002). 
15  Barry E Carter, Economic Coercion, MPEPIL (2009) 
(http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1518?rskey=fpJKgW&result=2&prd=EPIL), para. 1: ‘the 
term ‘economic coercion has traditionally been difficult to define’; Omer 
Yousif Elagab, The Legality of Non-forcible Counter-Measures in 
International Law (1988), 525: “any definition of the concept of coercion [is] 
uniquely difficult to obtain”. See also Philip Kunig, intervention, prohibition 
of, MPEPIL (2008) 
(http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1434?rskey=V5a1XH&result=2&prd=EPIL), para. 25. 
16  Tom Ruys, Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures: Concepts and 
International Legal Framework, in: van den Herik, above n.11, 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2760853), 7; Nigel 
White and Ademola Abass, Countermeasures and sanctions, in: Malcolm D. 
Evans International Law (2010), 531. 
17  ILC Commentaries to DASR, in: ILC Yearbook 2001/11(2), Commentary to 
Article 18, 69 para. 2; see also Commentary to Article 23, 76 para. 2. 
18  Ibid, 69 para. 2. 
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without clarifying what unlawful coercion would be except to give two 
examples: “a threat or use of force contrary to” the UN Charter and 
“intervention, i.e. coercive interference, in the affairs of another State”.19 
 8. With regard to the second illustration, it is worth quoting Special 
Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy’s definition of UCM: 
 
measures including, but not limited to, economic and political ones, 
imposed by States or groups of States to coerce another State in order to 
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights with a view to 
securing some specific change in its policy.20 
 
Here, as well as in the second example given by the ILC, the scope of coercion 
is linked to the scope of a State’s “sovereign rights”. In other words, unlawful 
coercion requires a breach of the principle of non-intervention. This nexus 
with the prohibition of intervention can be found throughout academia. 
 9. It is generally argued that the legality of economic coercive measures is 
related to two general principles of international law. First, economic sanctions 
are usually considered to fall within the scope of the Lotus principle.21 States are 
at liberty to conduct their economic relations as they choose provided they 
respect the obligations they have freely consented to by adhering to a treaty or 
the legal norms that have been recognized as customary international law.22 In 
light of this first principle, economic coercion is prima facie legal; the issue of 
legality will depend on the rules that apply in a given situation.23 The second 
                                                     
19  Ibid, 70 para. 3. 
20  HRC Report of the SR, above n 6, 4 para. 13 (emphasis added), this definition 
is based on HRC Res 27/21, Human rights and unilateral coercive measures, 
(adopted 26 September 2014). 
21  The Case of the S.S Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ 1927 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf), 18. 
22  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf) (“Military and Paramilitary 
Activities”), para. 276: “A State is not bound to continue particular trade 
relations longer than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty 
commitment or other specific legal obligation”. 
23  Thus recalling the concepts of retorsion and countermeasures. Sanctions 
adopted within the field of economic freedom are retorsions under public 
international law, politically unfriendly but lawful acts. If a sanction breaches 
the sending State’s obligations towards the target State under conventional or 
customary international law, then the countermeasure argument could be 
raised as a justification provided certain conditions are respected, as defined in 
the DASR referred to above n 14. See also Elagab, above n.15, 545; Joyner, 
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principle that is applied is the prohibition of intervention. A State’s freedom to 
adopt coercive economic measures is limited by the targeted State’s freedom to 
regulate matters that fall within the scope of its internal affairs. However, this is 
not always an easy line to draw,24 especially if we consider that fewer matters 
are strictly within a State’s domestic jurisdiction.25 It follows that a discussion 
on illegal acts of coercion quickly becomes intertwined with the debate on the 
scope of the principle of non-intervention. This adds additional complications 
as the prohibition of intervention has been described as the “most potent and 
elusive of all principles”.26 Further, it is unclear exactly what threshold UCM 
need to reach in order to constitute an unlawful intervention as the conduct has 
to amount to an irresistible pressure on the target State, causing it to be forced 
to make a decision within the scope of its domaine réservé under constraint with 
no means of escape.27  
 10. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the ICJ 
explained that an act would be considered as an intervention when it involves 
trespassing: 
 
directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A 
prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in 
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to 
decide freely. […] Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of 
coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.28 
 
The Court found that coercion forms the very essence of the principle of non-
intervention and further stated that this element would be obvious when the 
                                                                                                                             
above n.11, 7-8; Vaughan Lowe and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Economic 
Warfare, MPEPIL (2013) 
(http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e292?rskey=zvbIVf&result=1&prd=EPIL), paras 36 to 42. 
24  Kunig, above n.15, paras 25 and 26. 
25  Ibid, para. 3; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The Right to Be Free From Economic 
Coercion, 4:1 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 
(2015), 631. 
26  Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention, 22:2 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2009), 345. 
27  Thomas Giegerich, Retorsion, MPEPIL (2011) 
(http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e983?rskey=nNzN4Y&result=1&prd=EPIL) para. 24; ILC 
Commentaries to DASR, above n.17, commentary to Article 23, 76 para. 2.  
28  Military and Paramilitary Activities, above n.22, para. 205.  
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intervention involves the use of force.29 However, the Court did not discuss the 
threshold that needs to be met in order for economic pressure to be considered 
coercive and was quite restrictive when it came to applying the principle of 
non-intervention to such acts.30 Indeed, in response to Nicaragua’s complaint 
that the US cessation of economic aid and the imposition of a trade embargo 
amounted to indirect intervention,31 the Court found “that it is unable to regard 
such action on the economic plane […] as a breach of the customary-law 
principle of non-intervention”.32 Two remarks can be made on this finding. 
 11. First, the phrase “such action” is rather ambiguous; it is unclear 
whether the Court’s conclusion was only relevant to the American action 
against Nicaragua or to embargos in general.33 Nevertheless, embargoes are 
frequently given as examples of retorsion;34 this is the case, for instance, in the 
commentaries to the DASR.35 Thus, according to Ruys, the Nicaragua dictum 
confirms that embargos are not necessarily unlawful and that the prohibition of 
measures amounting to economic intervention must be “narrowly construed”.36 
Lowe and Tzanakopoulos have indicated that the legal characterization of 
embargoes adopted “in peacetime will depend on the circumstances and on the 
particular international obligations in force between the States in question”.37 
Consequently, they could qualify as either acts of retorsion, countermeasures or 
simply as internationally wrongful acts.38 This reasoning seems to be in line 
with the Court’s finding that the US economic measures against Nicaragua 
violated the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956. 39 
Accordingly, though the embargo did not amount to an intervention in 
Nicaragua’s domaine réservé, it still constituted an internationally wrongful act. 
 12. Second, even if the trade embargo against Nicaragua was not 
considered to be a breach of the prohibition of intervention, it does not mean 
                                                     
29  Ibid. 
30  Jamnejad and Wood, above n.26, 370. 
31  Military and Paramilitary Activities, above n.22, paras 123 and 125. It has been 
argued that the American measures had devastating effects on Nicaragua’s 
already weak economy, see, e.g., William M. Leogrande, Making the Economy 
Scream: US Economic Sanctions against Sandinista Nicaragua, 17:2 Third 
World Quarterly (1996), 329. 
32  Military and Paramilitary Activities, above n.22, para. 245. 
33  Jamnejad and Wood, above n.26, 371.  
34  Dupont, above n.5, 312. 
35  ILC Commentaries to DASR, above n.17, 128, para. 3. 
36  Ruys, above n.16, 7. 
37  Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, above n.23, para. 36.   
38  Ibid. 
39  Military and Paramilitary Activities, above n.22, para. 276. 
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that the embargo was not coercive. An act does not need to constitute an 
intervention in the State’s domaine réservé in order for it to be considered 
coercive.40 As we saw in the beginning of this section, a coercive sanction aims 
at changing the behaviour of the target or its policy objective;41 this can be 
achieved without intervening in the State’s internal affairs. All the same, there 
appears to be a general consensus in legal doctrine that economic sanctions 
must amount to intervention in order to be considered illegal coercion. 42  
However, not only has the bar been set so high it seems near impossible to 
reach, as illustrated below, scholars are at pains to argue that the principle of 
non-intervention encompasses acts of economic coercion.  
 13. In 1988, Elagab concluded that “the principle of non-intervention 
did not seem to have crystallized into a clear rule prohibiting economic 
coercion”, though he believed that there was a gradual emergence of rules that 
would limit the scope of permissible acts of economic coercion.43 By contrast, 
relying on “UN instruments that authoritatively interpret the Charter”, 
Boumedra argued that there is sufficient evidence that economic coercion 
would be prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.44 This view does not 
seem to have convinced many legal scholars. It appears that economic coercion 
is essentially considered to remain within the scope of a State’s freedom to 
conduct its economic relations and for the most part is only regulated by the 
legal obligations a State has expressly consented to or that have been 
recognized as international custom. 45  Recently, Ruys concluded that: “it 
remains altogether unclear to what extent exactly the principle of non-
                                                     
40  However, see, e.g., Tzanakopoulos, above n.25, 623: the author differentiates 
between “coercion/intervention/coercive interference” and “mere pressure or 
interference”, and 626, the distinction is made between “inducement” and 
“coercion”. 
41  This general definition is given in political science literature; See e.g. Thomas J. 
Biersteker, Susan E. Eckhart and Marcos Tourinho (eds), Targeted Sanctions: 
The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action (2016), 225-226. 
This is also apparent in Lowenfeld’s definition, above n.13 and accompanying 
text, and in ILC Commentaries to DASR, above n.17, commentary to Article 
18 where the Commission makes the distinction between “coercion” and 
“unlawful coercion”. 
42  Joyner, above n.11, 12; Tzanakopoulos, above n.25, 623; Elagab, above n.15, 
534; Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, above n.23, para. 38; Ronzitti, above n.13, 6. 
43  Elagab, above n.15, 542 and 544. 
44  Tahar Boumedra, Economic Coercion under International Law, 2 African 
Society of International and Comparative Law Proceedings of the Second 
Annual Conference (March 1990), 81-83. 
45  White and Abass, above n 16, 538. 
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intervention prohibits certain economic sanctions. […] The question continues 
to puzzle legal doctrine.”46 Tzanakopoulos has gone further in arguing that 
illegal acts of economic coercion barely exist in present-day international law.47 
 14. This notwithstanding, numerous General Assembly Resolutions have 
been adopted condemning coercive economic measures as a means to influence 
a State’s internal affairs,48 suggesting that such acts are inconsistent with the 
prohibition of intervention. Despite the organ’s extensive practice, in 1993 the 
UN Secretary-General published a report reiterating the findings of an expert 
group: “[t]here is no clear consensus in international law as to when coercive 
economic measures are improper”.49 The difficulty in determining whether or 
not the UN’s practice would lead to the emergence of a legal norm that restricts 
the use of economic coercion under the principle of non-intervention lies in 
establishing the normative value of the said practice. The resolutions are 
generally political in nature and adopted by a heavily divided vote, thus lacking 
legal authority. 50  According to Jamnejad and Wood, among the many 
resolutions that have been adopted the most “significant” ones are Resolution 
2131 (XX) Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention (1965), 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations (1970) and Resolution 36/103 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs of States (1981).51 It is also relevant to refer to Resolution 3281, 
the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974). 
 15. The first two resolutions do not explicitly mention economic 
coercion as a form of intervention. The debates held on Resolution 2131 (XX) 
reveal that Member States were more concerned about subversion and respect 
of the right to self-determination.52 Prior to the adoption of Resolution 2625, 
only the Bolivian delegation made an express reference to economic sanctions 
                                                     
46  Ruys, above n.16, 7. 
47  Tzanakopoulos, above n.25, 633. 
48  Carter, above n.15, para.7. See GA resolutions referred to in subsequent 
paragraphs. 
49  Note by the Secretary-General, Economic measures as a means of political 
and economic coercion against developing countries, A/48/535 (25 October 
1993), point 2(a). 
50  Carter, above n.15, para.8. 
51  Jamnejad and Wood, above n.26, 350-351. See also Ronzitti, above n.13, 4-5. 
52   Statements made by the USSR, Brazil and Guatemala, A/PV.1408 (21 
December 1965), para. 108 (USSR), para. 119 (Brazil) and para. 125 
(Guatemala). 
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as measures encompassed by the principle of non-intervention.53 Additionally, 
Pakistan stated that the prohibition of the threat or use of force should include 
“economic, political and other forms of pressure”.54 These are the only explicit 
statements regarding economic pressure as a violation of the principle of non-
intervention. 
 16. The Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(Resolution 3281 (1974)) asserts that economic and political relations between 
States should be governed by, inter alia, the principles of non-aggression and 
non-intervention.55 More specifically, Article 32 states that: 
 
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other 
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights. 
 
It nevertheless appears that the Charter does not have normative value. Elagab 
has argued that the Charter is not a binding instrument and that Article 32 
cannot be read as legally prohibiting economic coercion; instead it should be 
read as expressing an “ideal”.56 
 17. Finally, Resolution 36/103 explicitly refers to economic coercion 
under paragraph 2 point II(k); pursuant to this provision the principle of non-
intervention in the internal and external affairs of States comprises: 
 
the duty of a State not to use its external economic assistance programme 
or adopt any multilateral or unilateral economic reprisal or blockade and to 
prevent the use of transnational and multinational corporations under its 
jurisdiction and control as instruments of political pressure or coercion 
against another State, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Point II(l) of paragraph 2 also highlights:  
 
The duty of a State to refrain from the exploitation and the distortion of 
human rights issues as a means of interference in the internal affairs of 
                                                     
53  Statement made by Bolivia before the UNGA Sixth Committee, 
A/C.6/SR.1181 (25 September 1970), para. 22. 
54  Statement made by Pakistan before the UNGA Sixth Committee, 
A/C.6/SR.1179 (24 September 1970), paras. 18-19. 
55  UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 1974) (adopted by 120 to 6 against; 
10 abstentions and 2 non-voting), Chapter 1, points (c) and (d). 
56  Elagab, above n.14, 543-544. See also Texaco Overseas Petroleum 
Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v. the Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic 17 ILM 1 (1978) (hereafter “Texaco v. Libya”), paras 85-88. 
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States [and] of exerting pressure (…). 
 
Because resolution 36/103 was adopted with 22 negative votes, it would appear 
to have little normative value.57 All the same, the above quoted paragraphs echo 
the concerns of developing States that allege that developed countries misuse 
claims concerning human rights violations to justify measures of economic 
coercion. 58  They also protest against these measures’ negative effects. It is 
within this context that the resolutions entitled Human rights and Unilateral 
Coercive Measures and Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic 
coercion against developing countries are adopted. We will now study the content of 
these texts and the reasons given for their adoption. 
III. The UN General Assembly debates and resolutions on unilateral 
coercive measures and the absence of an emerging prohibition 
18. If we chose to study the resolutions entitled Human rights and unilateral coercive 
measures, it is not only because of the Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy’s 2015 
Report, but also because they explicitly denounce UCM for being incompatible 
with international law and have done so repeatedly since 1996. For similar 
reasons, we believe it was useful to complement our analysis with the 
resolutions on Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion 
against developing countries. Additionally, to this author’s knowledge, very little has 
been written on these resolutions’ normative value.59 The goal of this section is 
to assess the legal value of the denunciations in order to determine if the 
resolutions constitute an emerging prohibition of UCM, as suggested by Special 
Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy, and if they provide insight on the legal issues that 
have puzzled legal doctrine. 
 
III.A. The condemnation of economic coercion through the UN General 
Assembly 
 
                                                     
57  Kunig, above n.15, para. 20. 
58  Statements made before the UNGA Third Committee: A/C.3/63/SR.44 (24 
February 2009), paras 103-104 (Myanmar); A/C.3/51/SR.48 (22 November 
1996), para. 21 (Syria); A/C.3/51/SR.47 (21 November 1996), para. 6 (DPR 
of Korea), and para. 9 (Myanmar). 
59  However see Ruys, above n.16, 6: refers to the resolutions on Unilateral 
economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries 
without assessing their normative value. Similarly, see Ronzitti, above n.13, 13-
14; and Dupont, above n.5, 316, referring to debates in the “Second 
Committee of the UN General Assembly” and to the positions of the NAL 
and G77. 
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19. Adopted on an annual basis by the Third Committee – the GA’s social, 
economic and cultural committee – then voted by the GA, the resolutions on 
Human rights and unilateral coercive measures are annually submitted by the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). 60  UCM are rejected “as tools for political or 
economic pressure” because of their negative effect on human rights.61 The 
resolutions also express concern about these measures’ negative impact “on 
international relations, trade, investment and cooperation”62 and urge States to 
cease adopting them. Since 1996, twenty-one resolutions on Human rights and 
unilateral coercive measures have been adopted. 
 20. The resolutions entitled Unilateral economic measures as a means of political 
and economic coercion against developing countries are introduced on a bi-annual basis 
on behalf of the Group of 77 (G77) and China63 and adopted by the Second 
Committee, the social and economic committee. From 1993 to the time of 
writing, nineteen resolutions have been adopted.  Since 1993, these resolutions: 
 
[urge] the international community to adopt urgent and effective measures 
to eliminate the use of unilateral coercive economic measures against 
developing countries that are not authorized by relevant organs of the 
United Nations or are inconsistent with the principles of international law 
as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and that contravene the 
basic principles of the multilateral trading system.64 
 
A new clause was added in 2007, calling “upon the international community to 
condemn and reject the imposition of the use of such measures as a means of 
political and economic coercion against developing countries”.65 
 21. Both resolutions affirm that UCM constitute a violation of 
international law, including the principles set out in the UN Charter, and urge 
States to eliminate such practice. These texts refer to the principle of non-
intervention in condemning the adoption of “economic, political or any other 
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the 
                                                     
60  Since 2006, the draft resolutions have been introduced by Cuba on behalf of 
the NAM. For a list of the NAM’s members see: 
http://www.nam.gov.za/media/040802b.htm. 
61  UNGA Res 51/103 (3 March 1997) to UNGA Res 71/193, above n.7. 
62  UNGA Res 55/110 (13 March 2001) to UNGA Res 71/193, above n.7. 
63  The texts were first introduced on an annual basis from 1983 to 1987, since 
1987 the topic is discussed bi-annually. Note that they were first introduced 
under the title Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against 
developing countries; the word “unilateral” was added in 1997. 
64  UNGA Res 48/168 (22 February 1994) to UNGA Res 70/185, above n.8. 
65  UNGA Res 62/183 (31 January 2008) to UNGA Res 70/185, above n.8.  
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subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights”, in reference to Resolution 
2526 (XXV) 66  or to Article 32 of Resolution 3281 (1974). 67  The main 
distinction is that the texts entitled Unilateral economic measures as a means of 
political and economic coercion against developing countries place more emphasis on 
these measures’ negative impact on the right to development, economic 
cooperation and the development of a non-discriminating multilateral trading 
system. The resolutions on Human rights and unilateral coercive measures, as their 
title indicates, are concerned with unilateral sanctions’ negative impact on the 
fulfilment of human rights in the targeted States, which include the right to 
development as well as other social and economic rights. These texts also 
condemn such sanctions’ extraterritorial effect and their harmful influence on 
areas pertaining to international relations, trade, investment and cooperation. 
 22. In both cases, the resolutions are adopted by a large majority; we can 
also observe a political rift in the voting patterns. When the topic on Human 
rights and unilateral coercive measures was first introduced in the United Nations in 
1996, the vote was more or less evenly split: 57 voted in favour, 45 voted 
against and 59 abstained.68 Since then the voting pattern has changed. In the 
last years, about 130 developing countries vote in favour of these resolutions 
whereas more or less 50 developed countries – mainly the US, the EU Member 
States and their allies – cast a negative vote. Similarly, the resolutions on 
Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing 
countries are adopted by a large majority against only two negative votes 
emanating from the US and Israel; on the other hand, EU Member States 
abstain. It follows that these resolutions are generally adopted by roughly 130 
positives votes to two negative votes and around 50 abstentions. Consequently, 
the two texts are typically adopted by slightly over two-thirds of the General 
Assembly’s Member States. 
 23. Turning to the explanations of the votes, the NAM69 and G77 and 
China are consistent in denouncing the adoption of non-UN sanctions against 
developing countries. For instance, the latter group has expressed their 
opposition: 
 
                                                     
66  Ibid. 
67  Resolutions referred to above n.61. 
68  Voting result for UNGA Res 51/103. 
69  See the statements made by Cuba on behalf of the NAM in the UNGA Third 
Committee: A/C.3/66/SR.44 (15 November 2011), para. 59; 
A/C.3/67/SR.44 (26 November 2012), para. 7; A/C.3/68/SR.49 (21 
November 2013), para. 47; A/C.3/68/SR.43 (7 November 2013), para. 11; 
A/C.3/69/SR.44 (13 November 2014), para. 17; A/C.3/70/SR.48 (17 
November 2015), para. 7. 
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to the imposition of unilateral economic measures as an instrument of 
political and economic coercion against developing countries. Such action 
was not in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
international law or the rules-based multilateral trading system, and 
undermined the sovereign equality of States.70 
 
The NAM has also called on “States to refrain from [UCM] against other States 
with the aim of enforcing compliance, particularly where such measures were 
inconsistent with the Charter and international law”. 71 In addition, we can refer 
to comments sent by governments to the Secretary-General contesting the 
adoption of unilateral sanctions.72 
 24. On the other side of the spectrum, developed States cast negative 
votes or abstain. According to the US, the draft resolutions on Human rights and 
unilateral coercive measures have 
 
no basis in international law and [do] not serve to advance the cause of 
human rights. […] The [resolutions challenge] the sovereign right of States 
to conduct their economic relations freely and to protect legitimate 
national interests, including by taking actions in response to national 
security concerns. The [resolutions] undermine the ability of the 
international community to respond to acts that were offensive to 
international norms. Unilateral and multilateral sanctions were a legitimate 
means to achieve foreign policy, security, and other national and 
international objectives. The United States was not alone in that view or 
practice.73 
 
                                                     
70  Statements made on behalf of the on behalf of the G77 and China in the 
UNGA Second Committee: A/C.2/60/SR.17 (31 October 2005), para. 24 
(Jamaica); A/C.2/68/SR.20 (24 October 2013), para. 26 (Fiji). 
71  Statements made by Malaysia on behalf of the NAM in the UNGA Third 
Committee: A/C.3/59/SR.48 (19 November 2004), para. 21; 
A/C.3/60/SR.45 (21 November 2005), para. 49.  
72  Reports of the UN Secretary-General on Unilateral economic measures as a 
means of political and economic coercion against developing countries, 
A/64/179 (27 July 2009); A/66/138 (14 July 2011); A/70/152 (16 July 2015). 
73  Statement made before the UNGA Third Committee, A/C.3/70/SR.52 (20 
November 2015), para.32. For similar statements by the US before the the 
UNGA Third Committee see also A/C.3/64/SR.42 (12 November 2009), 
para.56; A/C.3/66/SR.44 (15 November 2011), para.60; A/C.3/67/SR.44 (26 
November 2012), para.12; A/C.3/68/SR.49 (21 November 2013), para.54; 
A/C.3/69/SR.52 (24 November 2014), para.33. 
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By describing sanctions as part of a State’s right to conduct its economic 
relations freely, the US is implicitly referring to the Lotus principle. The US 
justifies its negative vote against draft resolutions on Unilateral economic measures 
as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries in a similar 
fashion.74  
 25. Although the EU Member States do not explain their vote against 
the resolutions on Human rights and unilateral coercive measures, in the context of 
the second topic at hand the EU has constantly stated that: 
 
economic measures should be compatible with the principles of 
international law as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, including 
in the wider sense the principles of the multilateral trading system and the 
rules of the World Trade Organization.75 
 
Up until 2005, the EU explained that it abstained during the votes on the 
second topic because the draft resolutions focused solely on developing 
countries, thus excluding other members of the international community. 76 
                                                     
74  See statements by the US before the UNGA Second Committee: 
A/C.2/58/SR.36 (9 December 2003), para.4; A/C.2/64/SR.41 (9 December 
2009), para.7; A/C.2/66/SR.37 (1 December 2011), para.2; A/C.2/68/SR.36 
(14 November 2013), para.8; A/C.2/70/SR.31 (12 November 2015), para.20. 
See also Statement made before the General Assembly A/62/PV.78 (19 
December 2007), at 11-12 (US). 
75  Statement made on behalf of the EU before the UNGA Second Committee, 
A/C.2/60/SR.33 (2 December 2005), para.13 (UK, speaking on behalf of the 
EU). Similar statements also made on behalf of the EU in the Second 
Committee: A/C.2/54/SR.43 (24 November 1999), para.33 (Finland), 
specifying that “any coercive economic measure should be condemned”; 
A/C.2/56/SR.36 (4 December 2001), para.5 (Belgium), here the EU also 
specified that “Unilateral measures should not be taken against any Member 
State”;  A/C.2/58/SR.36 (9 December 2003), para.5 (Italy); A/C.2/62/SR.28 
(16 November 2007), para.29 (Portugal); A/C.2/64/SR.41 (9 December 
2009), para.10 (Sweden); A/C.2/66/SR.37 (1 December 2011), para.6 
(Poland); A/C.2/68/SR.36 (14 November 2013), para.9 (Lithuania); 
A/C.2/70/SR.31 (12 November 2015), para.21 (Luxembourg). 
76  Statement made on behalf of the EU before the UNGA Second Committee, 
A/C.2/60/SR.33 (2 December 2005), para.13 (UK, speaking on behalf of the 
EU). For similar statements made on behalf of the EU see UNGA Second 
Committee: A/C.2/52/SR.47 (4 December 1997), para.18 (Luxembourg); 
A/C.2/54/SR.43 (24 November 1999), para.33 (Finland); A/C.2/56/SR.36 (4 
December 2001), para.5 (Belgium); A/C.2/58/SR.36 (9 December 2003), 
para.5 (Italy). 
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However, since 2007, the EU states that: 
 
unilateral economic measures [are] admissible in certain circumstances, in 
particular when necessary in order to fight terrorism and the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, or to uphold respect for human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance.77 
 
Though it is unclear why the EU changed its justification, this shift could 
explain why (at least since 2007) the regional organization votes against the 
resolutions on Human rights and unilateral coercive measures as these resolutions are 
critical of the adoption of sanctions to enforce human rights, which the EU 
considers as an admissible policy.  
 26. Given the content of the resolutions and the claims made by UN 
Member States during the debates, it would appear that a large group of States 
deem UCM to be contrary to international law because of their negative impact 
on, inter alia, human rights and the right to development as well as the fact that 
they run counter fundamental principles of international law;78 including UN 
Charter principles such as the sovereign equality of States and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Further, UCM are argued to be illegal because they do 
not emanate from a Security Council decision; hence they are not multilateral.79 
The coercive nature of these measures stems from the fact that they aim at 
                                                     
77  Statement made on behalf of the EU before the UNGA Second Committee, 
A/C.2/62/SR.28 (16 November 2007), para.30 (Portugal, speaking on behalf 
of the EU). Other statements made on behalf of the EU in the UNGA 
Second Committee: A/C.2/64/SR.41 (9 December 2009), para.10 (Sweden); 
A/C.2/66/SR.37 (1 December 2011), para.6 (Poland); A/C.2/68/SR.36 (14 
November 2013), para.9 (Lithuania); A/C.2/70/SR.31 (12 November 2015), 
para.21 (Luxembourg). 
78  See in particular GA RES 69/180 (18 December 2014), Operative Clause 1. 
See also statements made by Iran before the UNGA Third Committee 
A/C.3/51/SR.52 (26 November 1996), para.12 and A/C.3/68/SR.35 (31 
October 2013), para.72. 
79  Statements made by Mexico and Russia before the UNGA Second Committee 
A/C.2/66/SR.35 (17 November 2011), para.3 (Mexico) and A/C.2/70/SR.31 
(12 November 2015), para.25 (Russia). See also Reports of the UN Secretary-
General on Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and 
economic coercion against developing countries A/68/218 (29 July 2013), 
responses received from Brazil at 5 and from Qatar at 11; response received 
from Paraguay in A/70/152 (16 July 2015), at 12. 
 On this issue see also debate at the Security Council, in particular statements 
made by Argentina, China and Russia, S/PV.7323 (25 November 2014), at 13 
(Argentina), 14 (China) and 19 (Russia). See also Ronzitti, above n.13, 18-21. 
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pressuring the target State to change a national policy that falls within its 
sovereign rights; this is the case even when the sanctions are used to enforce 
human rights. According to some Member States, human rights and terrorism 
are used as a pretext to justify economic coercion and intervention. 80 
Resolution 71/193 explicitly “condemns the inclusion of Members States in 
unilateral lists under false pretexts […] including false allegations of terrorism 
sponsorship”.81 It is therefore the source of the sanctions, their negative effects 
on rights and principles under international law, and the fear of abuse that give 
rise to their condemnation. 
 27. The EU and the US do not explicitly deny the coercive nature of 
unilateral sanctions. If at first the EU stated that such measures are 
inadmissible, it now states that they are “admissible in certain circumstances”.82 
The US on the other hand has argued that it is not a question of “coercion 
against developing countries, but of extending a hand of support to their 
peoples when their Governments have coerced them”. 83  These measures’ 
legality stems from the right of States to conduct their economic relations freely 
and from their legitimate policy objectives. 
 28. The debate is therefore centred on whether or not these measures of 
coercion are compatible with international law, and in particular with Article 41 
of the UN Charter whereby the Security Council can adopt coercive 
measures.84 Statements issued within the UN arena demonstrate that there is 
indeed a clear divide between “developed” and “developing” States. The claims 
seem to be reflected in State practice outside the UN85 and also confirm the 
political nature of sanctions: they are an accepted foreign policy tool for the 
States or group of States that adopt them and are measures contrary to 
international law according to the States that are targeted as well as the group 
                                                     
80  Statements made by China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
before the UNGA Third Committee, A/C.3/51/SR.47 (21 November 1996), 
paras 70 and 79 (China) and para.6 (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); 
Statement made by Eritrea before the UNGA, A/67/PV.19 (1 October 2012), 
at 23; Statement made by Syria before the UNGA Second Committee, 
A/C.2/70/SR.31 (12 November 2015), paras 28-29. 
81  GA RES 71/193, above n.7, Operative Clause 3. 
82  See above n.77.  
83  Speech by the US before the UN GA, A/60/PV.68 (22 December 2005), 7. 
84  According to the US, UN Charter provides further proof that economic 
coercion is permissible under international law; see statement made before the 
UNGA Second Committee A/C.2/66/SR.37 (1 December 2011), para.5. 
85  In the sense that the EU and the US are both active in adopting sanctions and 
the NAM Member States commit to refraining from adopting unilateral 
coercive measures (see below, Parts IV (A) and IV (B)).  
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they belong to.86 
 29. Having briefly provided an overview of the content of the 
resolutions and the explanations of the votes, we will now turn to the crux of 
the matter and evaluate these resolutions’ normative value and whether or not 
the resolutions contribute to the development of a prohibition of economic 
UCM. 
 
III.B The absence of an emerging prohibition 
 
30. As we saw in Part II of this paper, the majority opinion in doctrine is that 
there is no autonomous norm prohibiting economic coercion. Such practice is 
considered permissible to the extent that it does not violate the principle of 
non-intervention or that it does not violate other rules of customary 
international law or applicable treaty rules. Based on the previous discussion, 
we seek to determine if an autonomous prohibition of economic coercion has 
emerged.87 
 31. Given the political nature of the General Assembly and its lack of 
legislative power, certain scholars have expressed scepticism about providing 
normative value to GA resolutions.88 Nevertheless, it is accepted that they can 
influence international law by, inter alia, crystallizing emerging custom or by 
acting as a “focal point for the future development” of customary international 
law,89 provided certain conditions are met.90 
                                                     
86  That being said, inconsistencies can be found within the group of developing 
States. For instance, Mauritius spoke in favour of the sanctions against 
adopted Myanmar, where the military junta has been accused of using violence 
against the civilian population, see statement made before the UNGA, 
A/62/PV.10 (28 September 2007), at 19. Further, regional organizations of 
the global South, mainly the African Union and ECOWAS, adopt sanctions. 
However, these are (in principle) only against Member States and would thus 
be of a multilateral nature, as explained above para. 3.  
87   As suggested by SR Jazairy, recall above para. 3 and accompanying text. 
88  See, e.g., D.H.N Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, 32 BYBIL (1956); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of 
Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary International Law, 
73 American Society International Law Proceedings (1979). 
89  Blaine Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited, 58 BYBIL (1987), 68-
71, referring to Judge de Aréchaga. See also Rosalyn Higgins, The 
Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United 
Nations (1963); Jorge Castaneda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions 
(1969) 4-5; Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations 
and the System of the Sources of International Law (1979). 
90  International Law Association (ILA) Final Report of the Committee on the 
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 32. In the context of its conclusions on the identification of customary 
international law, the ILC’s Draft Conclusion 12(2) acknowledges that: “A 
resolution adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental 
conference may provide evidence for determining the existence and content of 
a rule of customary international”.91 In addition, Draft Conclusion 4(2) reads: 
“In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to 
the formation, or expression, or creation, of rules of customary international 
law.” 92  Concerning UNGA resolutions, the ILC called for caution when 
determining whether they create customary international law.93 For instance, 
one should take into account what States actually mean when they adopt a 
resolution, and hence pay attention to the resolution’s wording, the 
circumstances surrounding its adoption, as well as the reasons behind the 
vote.94 The voting figure can also be of importance, a resolution adopted by a 
two-third majority will carry less weight than one adopted unanimously;95 it is 
similarly recommended to observe whether the rule is followed in the practice 
                                                                                                                             
Formation of Customary (General) International Law (London Conference, 
2000), 55-65. See also Institute of International Law, Conclusions of the 
Thirteenth Commission on The Elaboration of General Multilateral 
Conventions and of Non-contractual Instruments Having a Normative 
Function or Objective, ‘Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations’ (Cairo, 1987).  
91  ILC Fourth Report on identification of customary international law (2016) 
(http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/695), 22 Draft Conclusion 12(2). 
See also ILC Third report on identification of customary international law 
(2015) (http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/682) 31-41, notably 
para.45. 
 The ILC’s approach has been considered too restrictive and ‘state-centric’ by 
some, see Rossana Deplano, Assessing the Role of Resolutions in the ILC 
Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law: 
Substantive and Methodological Issues, International Organizations Law 
Review (forthcoming 2017) 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2972639); and Jed 
Odermatt, The Development of Customary International Law by 
International Organizations, 66 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2017).  
92  ILC Fourth Report on identification of customary international law, above 
n.91, 21. 
93  ILC Third report on identification of customary international law, above n.91, 
32, para. 47, 
94  Ibid, 33, para. 47 and 34, para. 48. 
95  Ibid, 35, para. 49. 
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of States.96 Commenting on the ILC’s draft conclusions, a report written for 
the Informal Expert Group on Customary International Law of the AALCO 
suggested, inter alia, that: 
 
the practice of an international organization can count toward the 
formation or expression of customary international law only if it reflects 
the practice and positions of the member States and can be counted only 
with due regard to the strength of the support of its membership and the 
representativeness of the practice among the States in the international 
community.97 
 
The report also called for the Commission to clarify when resolutions will 
count as evidence in the identification of custom “in order to ensure better 
quality in and better respect for the exercise of sovereignty” and to prevent 
“resolutions of a political nature” to be considered “as constituent material for 
legally binding rules under customary international law”.98 
 33. Moreover, and as is well known, the ICJ has confirmed that General 
Assembly resolutions can potentially possess normative value.99 In its advisory 
opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ established 
that a resolution can provide “evidence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio 
juris”, which can be determined following an examination of “its content and 
the conditions of its adoption” as well as an examination of “whether an opinio 
juris exists as to its normative character”. 100  A resolution will not have 
normative value if it is adopted by a divided vote and if the alleged rule refers 
                                                     
96  Ibid, para. 51. 
97  YEE Sienho, Report on the ILC Project on “Identification of Customary 
International Law”, 14 Chinese JIL (2015), para. 33; see also para. 34. In this 
manner, the report supports the State-centric approach. 
98  Ibid, 398, Comment L on the use of the resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly and similar organizations. This comment illustrates 
AALCO’s concern that State sovereignty be reflected in the ILC’s draft 
conclusions, see Ibid, para. 15. 
99  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 16, (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/53/5595.pdf), 31, para.52; Military and Paramilitary 
Activities, above n.22, paras 99-100, 195 and 204; Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Report 2004, 136, (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf) paras 86-88. 
100   Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Report 1996, 226, (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf), para.70. 
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to general principles of international law rather than to a more specific one.101 
A further obstacle to a resolution’s normative value would be the contradictory 
State practice outside the United Nations.102 In addition, we can refer to the 
criteria outlined by Professor Dupuy, acting as Sole Arbitrator in the Texaco v. 
Libya case (1978), for establishing a resolution’s normative value: the type of 
resolution, the votes and their circumstances, and the legal provisions.103 In 
order to be binding, the resolutions must be accepted as such by the UN 
Member States. Even if a majority adopts the text, it needs to represent various 
groups of States.104 With regard to the content of the resolutions, Professor 
Dupuy made the distinction between provisions asserting a right accepted by 
the majority of States and provisions introducing new principles.  
 34. Turning to the topic of our study, the resolutions addressed above 
do not satisfy the required criteria for establishing the formation of an 
autonomous customary norm prohibiting economic coercion, or even an 
emerging prohibition. First, though a large majority adopts the resolutions, it 
only represents slightly above two-thirds of the Member States, thus carrying 
less quantitative weight. In addition, the vote remains heavily divided, especially 
in the case of the topic Human rights and unilateral coercive measures, and the 
majority is insufficiently representative of a variety of States. Concerning the 
resolutions on economic coercion against developing countries, though there 
are only two negative votes, on behalf of the US and Israel, there are over fifty 
abstentions emanating from the EU Member States and their allies. As the 
explanation of the abstention is ambiguous, it cannot count as inaction and 
therefore as a form of acceptance as law. Further, given the EU’s practice of 
adopting restrictive measures one could argue with difficulty that the 
organization believes that UCM are contrary to international law. 
 35. Second, the objections to sanctions do not refer to a specific 
prohibition but rather to general principles of international law and the UN 
Charter, such as the principle of non-intervention. Therefore, because of the 
broad nature of the condemnations it is unclear exactly what the scope of a 
potential prohibition would be. Measures of coercion are mainly condemned 
because of their effects on human rights or on the targeted State’s economy; 
States appear to be objecting to the misuse of UCM. The only clear legal claim 
would be that coercive measures cannot be adopted without a UNSC mandate, 
but this is immediately countered by US and EU’s voting patterns and their 
consistent adoption of non-UN sanctions. 
                                                     
101  Ibid, paras 71-72. 
102  Ibid, para.73. 
103  Texaco v. Libya, above n.56, 29, para.86. 
104  Ibid. 
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 36. Finally, though the resolutions are repeatedly adopted,105 repetition is 
not generally considered to be a sufficient basis for arguing that the provisions 
of a resolution represent custom.106 Consequently, the most that can be said 
about the texts is that they demonstrate a majority of the international 
community’s desire to, if not prohibit, then at least regulate resort to UCM and 
restrict their use. Indeed, the repeated adoption of these resolutions can be 
understood as an attempt to ‘establish international standards of behaviour’107 
by the large majority of States that vote in their favor. Through these 
resolutions, developing States are expressing their expectation that States 
refrain from adopting unilateral coercive measures in their international 
relations.108 This expectation is however not reciprocated by the developed 
States, in light of their negative votes and/or abstentions.  
 37. With these considerations in mind, the present author submits that it 
would be unsatisfactory to end the analysis here; the resolutions clearly 
illustrate tension between the aspirations of developing countries to restrict the 
use of economic coercion, even when their alleged aim is to enforce compliance 
with essential international norms, and the continuing practice of developed 
States.109 The debates on UCM within the United Nations seem to demonstrate 
that the dispute on the legality of economic coercion can also be read as a 
dispute on the legitimacy of these measures. On the one hand, developed States 
– such as the US and EU Member States – justify economic coercion as, among 
other things, a legitimate means to achieve foreign policy objectives and 
enforce community norms. On the other hand, developing States – through the 
Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement – condemn economic coercion 
by submitting that these acts, inter alia, constitute a form of wrongful 
intervention aimed at pressuring them into changing their internal policies. 
Though questions of legality are separate from considerations of legitimacy, if a 
State views a practice as illegitimate it may develop legal arguments as a means 
to contest the undesired behaviour. This appears to be the case regarding 
                                                     
105  See above paras 19 and 20. 
106  ILA Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary 
(General) International Law, above n.90, 59; Higgins, above n.89, 6; ILC Third 
report on identification of customary international law, above n.91, 40, para. 
53. 
107  Deplano, above n.91, at 20, citing Thomas M. Franck and Mark M. 
Munansangu, The New International Economic Order: International Law in 
the Making?, UNITAR Policy and Efficacy Studies n. 6 (1982). 
108  Although their own practice may sometimes be at odds with this expectation, 
see above n.86 and accompanying text. 
109  Similarly see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n.100, 
para.73. See also Jamnejad and Wood, above n.26, 370-371. 
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UCM, as the discussions at the UN seem to be influenced by political 
considerations and lead to a stalemate that has important implications for the 
development of international law. 110 
 38. Thus, having demonstrated the existence of a legal conundrum 
pertaining to UCM, in the next section we address the political issues it reflects 
by focusing on the social factors – mainly State identities and values111 – that 
contribute to its construction. Indeed, as demonstrated in Part II, 
commentators are aware of the objections to economic coercion yet struggle to 
properly address them; accordingly, there is the need for more clarity.  
IV. The legal claims on UCM: between justifying enforcement and 
resisting intervention  
39. If our objective is to address the stalemate resulting from the legal claims of 
both groups, then it is important to understand what led to its creation in the 
first place. To quote Koskenniemi, legal arguments do not descend from 
heaven but are the product of a group’s history and socialization.112 Choosing 
to apprehend the legal arguments of both groups from a sociological 
perspective, it is submitted that variables such as “norms” (or values) and 
“identity” can help explain these rival arguments and what is at stake for both 
parties. We can also refer to Jouannet, according to whom certain conflicts in 
international law are existential; their source lies in issues related to culture and 
identity.113 She has furthermore written that “all law transcribes the values of 
those that create it; it is not a substance-less form, but the translation of the 
values of the society it regulates”.114 To quote Koskenniemi again, international 
law “contains arguments and positions, precedents and principles that may be 
employed to express contrasting interests or values […]”.115 It follows that if a 
conflict on what the law should be arises, this may very well be caused by 
conflicting values (based on culture and ethical norms) and identities. 
                                                     
110  Oisin Suttle, Law as deliberative discourse: the politics of international legal 
argument – social theory with historical illustrations, 12:1 Journal of 
International Law and International Relations, at 176: “the dilemma is 
political; but it is through legal discourse that the dilemma is constituted.” 
111  Recall Hirsch, above n.12 and accompanying text. 
112  Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, the structure of the 
international legal argument (2007), 11. 
113  Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False 
Paradox of International Law?, 18:3 EJIL (2007), 402 
114  Ibid, 387. 
115  Martti Koskenniemi, International law in the world of ideas, in: James 
Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to 
International Law (2012), 59. 
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According to Hopf, “identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or 
preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with 
respect to particular actors”.116 This reasoning can also apply to international 
law, in the sense that a particular identity will imply a particular inclination for 
what should be legal or illegal. Norms are considered as values and as 
“expected standards of behaviour created within a given social setting”.117 As 
law’s purpose is to regulate behaviour, when a State claims that certain conduct 
is contrary to international law, it can also be using legal principles to argue that 
the behaviour is not conform to social expectations or to the ideals the 
community of States should strive to reach.118 
 40. In the section that follows we will assess the norms and identities of 
the US and of the EU, whose voting pattern in the GA and practice block the 
emergence of a prohibition of economic coercion. We will then turn to our 
second group of States, which contains the G77 and China and the NAM, who 
constantly submit the resolutions to the Second and Third Committees and 
who vote in their favor. As the positions as well as, to a certain extent, the 
membership of the G77 and China and the NAM overlap, 119 we will only focus 
on the latter group. By taking into account discourse from both groups,120 we 
will assess how each group defines itself in relation to the other group (identity) 
and identify what each group considers to be appropriate behavior as well as 
the values it believes international law should protect (social and ethical norms). 
                                                     
116  Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory 
23:1 International Security (1998), 175. See also David P. Houghton, 
Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a 
Constructivist Approach, 3 Foreign Policy Analysis (2007), 29-30. 
117  Jutta Brunnée and Stephan J. Toope, Constructivism and International Law, 
in: Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (2012), 
at 1; see also Peter Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on 
National Security, in: Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics (1996), 5. 
118  Moshe Hirsch, The Impact of the Advisory Opinion on Israel’s Future Policy: 
International Relations Perspective, Journal of International Law and 
International Relations (2004/2005), 338-339. 
119  China is, however, not a member of the NAM. We will nevertheless 
incorporate its position on UCM in section IV.B below. 
120  On the link between identity and discourse see Ted Hopf, Social Construction 
of International Politics (2002), 1: “each identity has associated with it a 
collection of discursive practices”; See also Hirsch, above n.12, 97: “language 
[…] and the construction of social identity are inextricably linked. […] 
Collective narratives and memories often contribute to the emergence and 
maintenance of social identities.” 
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IV.A. Coercion as legitimate enforcement: the United States and the 
European Union 
 
41. We begin with the US, which defines itself as a world leader responsible for 
promoting values that will make the world a better place. These are typically 
linked to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and liberalism. It would 
appear logical that sanctions are a necessary and legitimate tool for any State 
that considers itself a world leader and believes that it should promote specific 
values.121 As we saw above, the US consistently states that unilateral economic 
measures constitute a sovereign right. Sanctions are an important foreign policy 
tool designed to respond to threats to US interests, 122  including national 
security, foreign policy and economy. The concept of “threat” has a very broad 
meaning in American legislation, as a threat can constitute human rights 
violations in foreign countries. This far-reaching definition can be explained by 
the fact that if the US aims to promote values such as democracy and human 
rights, it is because these are viewed as not only serving their interests but also 
as necessary for the international community.123 In this sense, sanctions are 
used to demonstrate the US “commitment to advancing respect for human 
rights [and] safeguarding democratic institutions”. 124  Acts of economic 
coercion are permissible in as much as they seek to, inter alia, obtain “noble 
objectives” on behalf of the international community.125 Individuals and entities 
that are targeted by American sanctions have been described as “bad” or 
                                                     
121  US Department of the Treasury, Press Center “Remarks of Secretary Lew on 
the Evolution of Sanctions and Lessons for the Future at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace” (30 March 2016) 
(https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0398.aspx) 
(hereafter “Remarks of Secretary Lew”): “The power of our sanctions is 
inextricably linked to our leadership role in the world”. 
122  US Department of the Treasury, Remarks of Secretary Lew, above n.121; US 
Department of Treasury, About OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) 
(https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx) ; US 
Department of State, ‘Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation’ 
(http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/).  
123  Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, The Atlantic, April 2016. 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-
doctrine/471525/); See also US Department of the Treasury, Remarks of 
Secretary Lew, above n.121. 
124  US Department of State, Venezuela-Related sanctions 
(http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/venezuela/index.htm). 
125  See references above n.74. 
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“malign” actors. 126  The US has a “like-minded partner”, 127  the EU, which 
shares similar values and which is not against adopting sanctions, which it calls 
“restrictive measures”. 
 42. It is widely recognized that the EU also sees itself as the promoter of 
human rights and democratic values in international relations.128 The region 
differs from the US in the sense that it does not position itself as a world leader 
but instead defines itself as a partner with key international players, it therefore 
develops strategic partnerships through which it seeks to promote human 
rights norms and democratic values. 129  The actions that trigger the 
implementation of restrictive measures are not necessarily phrased in terms of 
“threat”, but as policies that the EU perceives as contrary to international law 
or ethical norms.130 The aim of the EU’s restrictive measures is to minimise 
negative effects of “undesirable” policies and to encourage a change in 
behaviour.131 Since the EU uses elements of soft power as a means to influence 
world affairs and promote its values, it needs to maintain relations with other 
States and in particular those it wants to influence. For these reasons, the EU 
uses sanctions strategically, arguing that they are permissible in certain 
circumstances, 132  but that they cannot be used in isolation. The desire for 
                                                     
126  US Department of the Treasury, Remarks of Secretary Lew, above n.121. 
127  Ibid. 
128  Evidenced by official documents: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
EU (2012) OJ C326/15 (hereafter “TEU”), Articles 2, 3(5) and 21. See also 
EU External Action Service (EEAS), Foreign Affairs 
(http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http:
//eeas.europa.eu/policies/index_en.htm). Restrictive measures play a key role 
in achieving foreign policy goals, as described here EEAS, Sanctions policy ( 
http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/sanctions-policy/423/sanctions-policy_en): 
“Sanctions are one of the EU’s tools to promote the objectives of the [CFSP]: 
peace, democracy and the respect for the rule of law, human rights and 
international law”. 
 On EU identity in relation to restrictive measures see Hirsch, above n.12, 106-
116. 
129  Based on TEU, above n.128, Articles 21 and 22. 
130  European Commission ‘Restrictive measures’ (Spring 2008) 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf, accessed 2 June 
2016) 1: “Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature 
which seek to bring about a change in activities or policies such as violations 
of international law or human rights, or policies that do not respect the rule of 
law or democratic principles”. 
131  Ibid, 6. See also EEAS, Sanctions policy, above n.128. 
132  Note that the EU explains that “All restrictive measures adopted by the EU 
are fully compliant with obligations under international law, including 
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partnership and the need to be strategic can provide an explanation for the 
ambiguity of the EU’s voting pattern in the UN debates on UCM. The EU 
cannot justify coercion in the same way as the US as this would place it against 
the States it wants to develop partnerships with, and yet the regional 
organization cannot entirely side with developing countries as this would be 
inconsistent with its practice133 and would place it in opposition to the US. The 
EU is therefore careful to state that sanctions are “admissible in certain 
circumstances” but that they should be adopted within a comprehensive policy 
approach. 
 43. The desire to enforce particular values is perceptible in the reasons 
given by the EU and the US as justifications for the UCM adopted against, 
amongst others, Myanmar, Syria, Belarus and Russia. The EU first adopted 
restrictive measures against Myanmar for severe violations of human rights, 
notably the repression of civil and political rights;134 they were subsequently 
renewed because there had been insufficient progress in the situation of human 
rights.135 As the situation improved the sanctions were progressively lifted but, 
at present, an arms embargo remains in place.136 Whereas trade and financial 
sanctions have been lifted, the EU sanctions against goods that may be used in 
internal repression have been renewed.137 Like the EU, the US implemented 
                                                                                                                             
those pertaining to human rights and fundamental freedoms” (emphasis in 
original) in: Sanctions: how and when the EU adopts restrictive measures 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/). 
133  This is quite different from the Russian approach to sanctions. During the 
Cold War, the USSR condemned the adoption of unilateral sanctions as a 
means to win over developing countries even though the Soviet Union also 
adopted such measures. See, e.g., Mergen Doraev, “The Memory Effect” of 
Economic Sanctions against Russia: opposing approaches to the legality of 
unilateral sanctions clash again, 37 U. Pa. J. Int’l L.  (2015), 355. 
134   Common Position 96/635/CFSP of 28 October 1996 defined by the Council 
on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on 
Burma/Myanmar, OJ L287/1 (1996). 
135  Council Common Position 2002/310/CFSP of 22 April 2002 extending 
Common Position 96/635/CFSP on Burma/Myanmar, OJ L107/1 (2002), 
para. 2. 
136  Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/627 of 21 April 2016 amending Decision 
2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma OJ 
L106/23 (2016); to be read in conjunction with Council Decision 
2013/184/CFSP of 22 April 2013 concerning restrictive measures against 
Myanmar/Burma and repealing Decision 2010/232/CFSP OJ L111/75 
(2013). 
137  Michael O’Kane, EU renews Burma/Myanmar sanctions for 1 year, European 
Sanctions (26 April 2017) (https://europeansanctions.com/2017/04/26/eu-
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sanctions in response to severe political repression. The sanctions were 
adopted in 1997138 and adapted over time as Myanmar progressively advanced 
democracy, culminating in elections in November 2015. Today, after almost 20 
years, the US sanctions against Myanmar have been lifted, including the arms 
embargo.139  
 44. EU restrictive measures were implemented against Syria for acts of 
political repression in 2011 and are still in force;140 the EU has affirmed that it 
“would continue imposing and enforcing sanctions targeting the regime and its 
supporters as long as repression continues”.141  Similarly, US sanctions were 
adopted against Syria in reaction to the government’s “human rights abuses, 
including those related to the repression of the people of Syria”.142 
                                                                                                                             
renews-burmamyanmar-sanctions-for-1-year/) 
138  Executive Order (“EO”) 13047 (22 May 1997) 
(https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/13047.pdf), progressively adapted by EO 
13310 (July 30 2003) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/13310.pdf); EO 13448 (October 23 2007) 
(https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/13448.pdf); EO 13619 (July 13 2012) 
(https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13619.pdf).  
139  EO “Termination of Emergency with Respect to the Actions and Policies of 
the Government of Burma” (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/burma_eo_termination.pdf).  
140  Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive 
measures against Syria, OJ L121/11 (2011); subsequently amended by Council 
Decision 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012 concerning restrictive 
measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/782/CFSP, OJ L330/21 
(2012), and Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning 
restrictive measures against Syria, OJ L47/14 (2013), which remains in force, 
see Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/917 of 29 May 2017 amending Decision 
2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria, OJ L319/62 
(2017). 
141  Council of the EU, Press Release, Syria: EU extends sanctions against the 
regime by one year (27 May 2016) 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/27-syria-
eu-extends-sanctions/). 
142  EO 13572 (May 3 2011) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13572.pdf), supplemented by EO 
13573 (May 20 2011) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13573.pdf) in view of the 
“continuing escalation of violence against the Syrian people”; and EO 13582 
(August 22 2011) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
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 45. With regard to the EU restrictive against Belarus, these have been 
implemented in response to Belarus’ alleged imprisonment of political activists 
and failure to hold free and fair elections, 143  hence for not respecting 
democratic principles. In February 2016, the EU lifted a significant amount of 
its restrictive measures, citing “improving EU-Belarus relations”.144 However, 
sanctions were reintroduced a year later.145 US sanctions were adopted against 
Belarus in 2006 for policies that undermine democratic process and human 
rights abuses related to political repression; 146  these measures have been 
promulgated.147  
 46. Concerning sanctions against Russia, in 2012, the US Congress 
adopted the Magnitsky Act, which targets individuals who are, inter alia, 
“responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other human rights violations 
committed against individuals seeking to promote human rights or to expose 
illegal activity carried out by officials of the government of the Russian 
Federation”.148 The scope of the Act was enlarged by Congress to target human 
                                                                                                                             
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/syria_eo_08182011.pdf). 
143   Council Common Position 2004/661/CFSP of 24 September 2004 
concerning restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus, OJ 
L301/67 (2004), repealed by Council Common Position 2006/276/CFSP of 
10 April 2006 concerning restrictive measures against certain officials of 
Belarus and repealing Common Position 2004/661/CFSP, OJ L101/5 (2006). 
Further restrictive measures were imposed in 2006, 2010 and 2012 for alleged 
violations of electoral standards. 
144  Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on Belarus (15 February 2016)  
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/15-fac-
belarus-conclusions/?utm_source=dsms-
auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Council+conclusions+on+Belar
us).  
145  Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/350 of 27 February 2017 amending Decision 
2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus, OJ L 50/81 
(2017). See also Michael O’Kane, EU renews Belarus sanctions, European 
Sanctions (28 February 2017) 
(https://europeansanctions.com/2017/02/28/eu-renews-belarus-sanctions-
2/). 
146  EO 13405 (20 June 2006) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/13405.pdf). 
147   White House Press Release (10 June 2016) 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/10/message-
continuation-national-emergency-respect-actions-and-policies). 
148  HR 6156, 112th Congress, Russia And Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and 
Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (December 12 2012) 
(https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-
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rights abuses worldwide.149 Additionally, since 2014, US sanctions150 and EU 
restrictive measures 151  have been implemented against Russia in order to 
condemn its violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and its 
perceived interference in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. In adopting these 
measures, the European Council stated that the aim is to send a “powerful 
signal to the leaders of the Russian Federation: destabilising Ukraine, or any 
other Eastern European neighbouring State, will bring heavy costs to its 
economy” and will cause Russian isolation. 152 In light of the concerns that 
President-elect Trump would lift the sanctions against Russia, prior to leaving 
                                                                                                                             
bill/6156?q={%22search%22%3A[%22H.R.+6156%22]}&r=2). 
 Note that the Canada, Lithuania, Estonia and the United Kingdom have 
adopted their own “Magnitsky-type” sanctions. See: Michael O’Kane, 
Canadian government endorses Magnitsky sanctions bill, European Sanctions 
(22 May 2017) (https://europeansanctions.com/2017/05/22/canadian-
government-endorses-magnitsky-sanctions-bill/); Maya Lester, Lithuanian 
parliament introduces Magnitsky sanctions bill, European sanctions (28 April 
2017) (https://europeansanctions.com/2017/04/28/lithuanian-parliament-
introduces-magnitsky-sanctions-bill/); Michael O’Kane, Estonia introduces 
Magnitsky-style sanctions on human rights violators, European sanctions (19 
December 2016) (https://europeansanctions.com/2016/12/19/estonia-
introduces-magnitsky-style-sanctions-on-human-rights-violators/); Michael 
O’Kane, UK set to vote on “Magnitsky” sanctions against human 
rights violators, European sanctions (5 December 2016) 
(https://europeansanctions.com/2016/12/05/uk-set-to-vote-on-magnitsky-
sanctions-against-human-rights-violators/). 
149  S 284, 114th Congress, Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 
(17 December 2016) (https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-
bill/284). 
150  EO 13660 (6 March 2014); EO 13661 (16 March 2014); EO 13662 (20 March 
2016), all available here: 
(https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/). 
151  Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive 
measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, OJ L 78/16 (2014), para. 
4; Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive 
measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine OJ 
L 229/13 (2014). 
152  European Council, Statement by the President of the European Council 
Herman Van Rompuy and the President of the European Commission in the 
name of the European Union on the agreed additional restrictive measures 
against Russia, EUCO 158/14 (29 July 2014), 
(https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec
/144158.pdf).  
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office in January 2016 Barack Obama reiterated that the rationale behind the 
sanctions “has to do with [Russia’s] actions in Ukraine. And it is important for 
the United States to stand up for the basic principle that big countries don’t go 
around and invade and bully smaller countries”.153 At the time of writing, the 
EU and US sanctions remain in place.  
 47. Finally, we can also refer to the US sanctions against Venezuela 
adopted in March 2015 for the Venezuelan government’s human rights 
violations and repression in response to political opposition.154 Furthermore, in 
May 2017, 8 judges of the Venezuelan Supreme Court were sanctioned “for a 
number of judicial rulings in the past year that have usurped the authority of 
Venezuela's democratically-elected legislature, the National Assembly […] 
thereby restricting the rights and thwarting the will of the Venezuelan 
people”.155 
 48. To summarize, sanctions are used to promote US and EU values, 
which are very much related to their political identities and the importance they 
attach to democratic regimes. They therefore exercise pressure on States to 
adopt similar values and to cease what they perceive as “bad” or “undesirable” 
behavior. Consequently, UCM are framed as legitimate enforcement of 
essential norms. Unsurprisingly, such policies are not well received by the 
targeted States, which we will now turn to. 
 
IV.B. Coercion as illegitimate intervention: the Non-Aligned Movement 
 
49. As is well known, the NAM came into existence during the Cold War; the 
objectives of this group were not only to safeguard their independence from 
external pressure, but also to speak against (neo-)colonial and imperialist 
practices. Today, restructuring the world economic order is also on the NAM’s 
agenda. Indeed, the NAM final documents reveal that the group is very 
conscious of the North/ South divide and economic discrepancies. As the 
NAM group is sensitive to this reality, it resents the fact that the so-called 
                                                     
153  Obama’s Last News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, NY Times (18 
January 2017) (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/politics/obama-
final-press-conference.html?_r=0).  
154 EO 13692 (March 11 2015) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/venezuela_eo.pdf); The White 
House, Office of the press secretary, FACT SHEET: Venezuela Executive 
Order (March 9 2015) (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/03/09/fact-sheet-venezuela-executive-order). 
155  US Department of the Treasury, Press Center, Treasury Sanctions Eight 
Members of Venezuela’s Supreme Court of Justice (18 May 2017) 
(https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0090.aspx). 
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“Powerful few” use their economic strength to impose behaviour and values.156   
 50. As a matter of policy, the group categorically rejects UCM157 and 
seeks to eradicate their adoption. 158  This was reiterated during the NAM 
summit of 2016, where the NAM heads of State and of government: 
 
expressed their condemnation at the promulgation and application of 
[UCM] against countries of the Movement, in violation of the Charter of 
the [UN] and international law, particularly the principles of non-
intervention, self-determination and independence of States subject of 
such practices. In this respect, they reiterated their determination to 
denounce and demand the repeal of such measures […].159 
 
 51. It is clear that the group of developing States expects behaviour that 
upholds UN principles and that they have a preference for multilateral rather 
than unilateral practices. This is evidenced by the fact that one of the main 
purposes and principles of the movement is “to promote and reinforce 
                                                     
156  Letter dated 98/10/07 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (“Letter dated 
98/10/07 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa”) S/1998/1071 
(13 November 1998), Annex I Final Document of the 12th Conference of 
Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (1998): at 13 point 
7, 17 point 23, 51-52 points 173, 174 and 177; 16th Summit of Heads of State 
or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Tehran Declaration’ Tehran, 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 30–31 August 2012 NAM/2012/Doc.7,  para. 1(e).  
157  16th Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, ‘Final Document’ Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, 26–31 August 
2012 NAM2012/Doc.1/Rev.2 (31 August 2012), para. 24.4. 
158  Letter dated 98/10/07 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa, 
above n.156, 9: “We must take up the challenge to fundamentally transform 
international relations, so as to eradicate (…) unilateral coercive measures and 
unfair economic practices”. See also 16th Summit, Tehran Declaration, above 
n.156, para.8. For similar positions expressed by the G77 see: Declaration on 
the occasion of the Twenty-fifth Annual Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 
77 (New York, 16 November 2001) 
(http://www.g77.org/doc/Decl2001.htm), para.30; Ministerial Declaration 
adopted by the 35th Annual Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
Group of 77 (New York, 23 September 2011) 
(http://www.g77.org/doc/Declaration2011.htm), para.39. 
159  Declaration of the 17th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, The Diplomatic Society (22 September 2016) 
(http://www.thediplomaticsociety.co.za/home/16-home/1939-17th-summit-
of-heads-of-state-and-government-of-the-non-aligned-movement), point 6 
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multilateralism and, in this regard, strengthen the central role that the [UN] 
must play”. 160 Historically, the UN arena enabled these States to successfully 
fight colonialism and gain independence; consequently the group attaches 
importance to the rules and principles of the UN Charter.161 The NAM believes 
that multilateralism and equality between States are undermined by the 
imposition of UCM162 and condemns “all manifestations of unilateralism and 
attempts to exercise hegemonic domination in international relations”.163 One 
of the NAM’s principles is to refrain from adopting sanctions against other 
countries. 164  If UCM are rejected, sanctions adopted by the UN Security 
Council are acceptable provided certain conditions are respected.165  
 52. The NAM countries also call for dialogue and a culture sensitive 
approach to human rights issues. 166  Whereas the EU adopts restrictive 
                                                     
160  14th Summit Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the NAM, 
Declaration on the Purposes and Principles and the Role of the Non-Aligned 
Movement in the Present International Juncture, Havana, Cuba, 11-16 
September 2006, NAM 2006/Doc.5/Rev.3, para.8(a), see also paras 2, 9(s), 
12(iii); Letter dated 2011/06/29 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt 
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General “Letter dated 
2011/06/29 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt”) S/2011/407 (7 
July 2011), Annex II Bali Commemorative Declaration on the 50th 
Anniversary of the Establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, 187. 
161  16th Summit Tehran Declaration, above n.156, para.1(b). 
162  Letter dated 2011/06/29 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt, above 
n.160, Annex I Final Document…, para.26.4; 16th Summit, Final Document, 
above n.157, paras 25.4 and 27.8. 
163  14th Summit, Declaration of the purposes and principles, above n.160, para. 
8(i). 
164  Ibid, para. 9.l. See also Letter dated 2011/06/29 from the Permanent 
Representative of Egypt, above n.160, Annex I Final Document…, para. 25.4. 
165   16th Summit, Final Document, above n.157, para. 91.5. In this document it is 
however indicated that Security Council sanctions are a “blunt instrument” 
and an “issue of serious concern” to the NAM. The Movement indicated that 
these measures should be imposed, inter alia, only when “there exists a threat 
to international peace and security or an act of aggression, in accordance with 
the Charter” and not “‘preventively’ in instances of mere violation of 
international law, norms or standards”. Further, the Security should only 
adopt sanctions after peaceful settlement measures have been exhausted. 
When it imposes such measures, the objectives should be “clearly defined”. 
This concern points to the fear of abuse of sanctions by the Security Council. 
See also Ibid, paras 92.8 and 226.20. 
166  Letter dated 2011/06/29 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt, above 
n.160, Annex I Final Document, para. 496.1: “human rights issues must be 
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measures in response to violations of civil and political rights, which are valued 
as democratic principles, certain developing countries argue that 
disproportionate attention is given to such rights, and recall the importance of 
economic, social and cultural rights.167 Although the US believes that human 
rights and democratic principles need to be enforced in order to make the 
world a better place, the NAM has stated that: 
 
We recognise that human rights and democracy do not, of themselves, 
automatically bring a better world. They require an environment of peace 
and development, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-
interference in the internal affairs of States. Socio-economic rights, 
including the right to development, are inextricably part of human rights.168 
 
 53. In addition to the NAM, China’s stance towards non-UN sanctions 
is equally relevant to this discussion.169 Indeed, China would appear to reject 
the adoption of unilateral coercive measures,170 as is elucidated in a statement 
made by the Chinese representative during a Security Council meeting on 
“General issues relating to sanctions”:  
 
a small number of countries act at will according their domestic laws and 
impose or threaten to impose unilateral sanctions against other States, 
which is not only in violation of the principle of sovereign equality among 
Member States but also undermine the authority of Council sanctions. […] 
                                                                                                                             
addressed within the global context through a constructive, non-
confrontational, non-politicized and non-selective dialogue based approach, in 
a fair and equal manner, with objectivity, respect for national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, 
impartiality, non-selectivity and transparency as the guiding principles, taking 
into account the political, historical, social, religious and cultural particularities 
of each country”. See also 16th Summit Tehran Declaration, above n.156, para. 
4; 14th Summit, Declaration of the purposes and principles, above n.160, point 
8(g). 
167  Statement by Iran before the UNGA Third Committee, A/C.3/68/SR.35 (31 
October 2013), para. 70; Statement by Nigeria before the UNGA Third 
Committee, A/C.3/69/SR.35 (30 December 2014), para. 53. 
168  Letter dated 98/10/07 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa, 
above n.156, 11. 
169  Notably because it votes in favour of the resolutions on Human Rights and 
Unilateral Coercive Measures and Unilateral economic measures as a means of 
political and economic coercion against developing countries.  
170   Recall above para. 1 of this article. China is also a member of AALCO, which 
condemned unilateral sanctions in the report quote above n.4. 
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Sanctions should not be a tool for one country to use in pursuit of power 
politics. The domestic law of one country should not become the basis for 
sanctions against other States. China is opposed to any practice of 
imposing sanctions on other countries on the basis of one’s domestic 
law.171 
 
More recently, a spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
reiterated that “[w]ith regard to unilateral sanctions, the Chinese side has all 
along disapproved of unilateral sanctions in international affairs. […]”.172 
 54. China’s opposition to unilateral sanctions echoes the NAM’s 
preference for multilateralism. Indeed, in 2015 President Xi Jinping asserted 
before the UN General Assembly that Member States “should be committed to 
multilateralism and reject unilateralism”.173 He also emphasized that “[States] 
should resolve disputes and differences through dialogue and consultation”.174 
The rejection of UCM and a preference for multilateral practices could be 
explained by what Vanhullebusch identified as China’s desire to adopt policies 
that promote harmony in inter-State relations in accordance with the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.175 Similarly to the creation of the NAM, 
                                                     
171   S/PV.7323, above n.79, 14. Also quoted in ZHU Lijiang, Chronology of 
Practice: Chinese Practice in Public International Law in 2014, 14 Chinese JIL 
(2015), 639-640, para.61. Other non-NAM members that made similar 
comments during meeting S/PV.7323, above n.79, are Argentina at 13 and 
Russia at 19.  
172   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on April 13, 2017 
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_66
5403/t1453551.shtml), answer given in response to the following question: 
“We are recently told by the US official that the US may be considering new 
economic sanctions for the DPRK, including some which may target Chinese 
companies and banks. Does China have any response?”. See also Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on January 
18, 2017, 
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1431615
.shtml): “China always opposes unilateral sanctions […]”. Recall the Russia-
China declaration on the Promotion of International Law, above n.1, as well 
as the Joint Communiqué of the 14th Meeting…, above n.3. 
173  Address by President H.E. Xi Jinping before the UNGA summit meeting, 
A/70/PV.13 (28 September 2015), 19. 
174  Ibid. 
175  Matthias Vanhullebusch, Regime Change, the Security Council and China, 14 
Chinese JIL (2015), 665-707. On the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
see the special issue in 13 Chinese JIL (2014). On Chinese approach to 
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these principles were initiated by China, India and Myanmar in “response to 
developing countries’ appeal against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, 
and reflected the aspirations of those countries for independence, autonomy, 
self-improvement and development”. 176  The adoption of unilateral coercive 
measures would seem to run counter the Five Principles. For instance, 
according to Liu Zhenmin, the principle of peace would require States to 
“refrain from unilateral actions, and commit themselves to settling disputes 
through negotiations and consultations”.177 Additionally, the concept of justice 
calls for States to avoid “apply[ing] international law selectively, or adopt[ing] 
double standards in the application of international law”. 178  This issue in 
particular is illustrated in targeted States’ reaction to the sanctions imposed 
against them, which they perceive as selectively imposed economic coercion. 
 55. Myanmar has criticized the “selective targeting of countries for 
political purposes and the imposition of double standards”.179 Likewise, Syria 
has claimed that the measures against it are arbitrary and indiscriminate. 180 
Rejecting all justifications of UCM, it believes that the protection of human 
rights and the fight against terrorism are used as a pretext to apply political 
pressure on developing States.181 Belarus has condemned the EU sanctions 
adopted against it as an attempt at exercising pressure “under the pretext of 
human rights protection” and has accused Western States of applying double 
standards.182  
 56. Finally, Venezuelan President Maduro responded to the American 
targeted sanctions by recalling an American diplomat and denouncing what it 
                                                                                                                             
international law more generally see Wim Muller, China an Illiberal, Non-
Western State in a Western-Centric Liberal Order?, 15 Baltic YIL (2015) and 
XUE Hanqin, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law; 
History, Culture and International Law (2012). 
176  LIU Zhenmin, Following the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and 
Jointly Building a Community of Common Destiny, 13 Chinese JIL (2014), 
para. 2. 
177  Ibid, para. 5. 
178  Ibid. 
179  Statement made by Myanmar before the UNGA Third Committee, 
A/C.3/69/SR.35 (30 December 2014), para. 70. 
180  Statement made by Syria before the UNGA Second Committee, 
A/C.2/68/SR.20 (17 December 2013), para. 58. 
181  Response received by Syria in the Report of the Secretary General, A/68/218 
(29 July 2013), 13-16; Statement made by Syria before the UNGA Second 
Committee, A/C.2/70/SR.31 (15 January 2016), para. 29.  
182  Statement made by Belarus before the UNGA Third Committee, 
A/C.3/69/SR.35 (30 December 2014), para. 44. 
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viewed as imperialist and interventionist practices. 183 Additionally, in March 
2015, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)184 and 
the United Nations of South American States (UNASUR)185 issued statements 
protesting the US targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials for human 
rights violations. According to UNASUR, the American executive order 
constitutes “a threat to sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states”.186 The Coordinating Bureau of the NAM also 
expressed solidarity with Venezuela, affirming its support for Venezuela’s 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.187 It appears that 
solidarity and unity within the group are an important means to resist pressure 
from a perceived powerful minority of States; as such, the movement has 
explicitly condemned sanctions against Zimbabwe and Syria.188  
 57. Lastly, although it is not a member of the NAM, Russia’s 
condemnation of UCM is also worth mentioning,189 and notably its reaction to 
the sanctions imposed against it by the EU and the US. In response to these 
                                                     
183  Catherine Shoichet, Venezuela recalls top diplomat in U.S. over sanctions, 
CNN (10 March 2016) 
(http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/09/americas/venezuela-diplomat-
recalled/); Venezuelan leader Maduro condemns new US sanctions, BBC (10 
March 2016) (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31813127) 
184   CELAC Unanimously Passes Resolution in Support of Venezuela, Telesur (26 
March 2015) (http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/CELAC-Unanimously-
Passes-Resolution-in-Support-of-Venezuela-20150326-0021.html). 
185  La Unasur pidió a los Estados Unidos que derogue las sanciones contra 
Venezuela, Infobae (14 March 2015) 
(http://www.infobae.com/2015/03/14/1715929-la-unasur-pidio-los-estados-
unidos-que-derogue-las-sanciones-contra-venezuela). 
186  South American Governments Slam Obama Over Venezuela Sanctions, 
Huffington Post (16 March 2015) ( 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/16/unasur-venezuela-
sanctions_n_6881886.html). 
187  Communiqué by the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement 
Rejecting the Latest Decision by the US Government Under the Executive 
Order Signed by President Barack Obama to Expand Unilateral Measures 
Against Venezuela (16 March 2015) (http://namiran.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/23-Communiqu%C3%A9-Rejecting-the-Latest-
Decision-by-the-US-Govt-to-Expand-Unilateral-Measures-Against-
Venezuela-16-March-2015.pdf). 
188  16th Summit, Final Document, above n.157, paras 323 and 362. Letter dated 
2011/06/29 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt, above n.160, 
Annex I Final Document, paras 285 and 316. 
189  Recall quotes in the introduction, above n.1 and n.3; see also n.79. 
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measures, Russia adopted a series of counter-sanctions targeting agricultural 
products from the sending States 190  and withdrew from nuclear-related 
agreements it had signed with the US. 191  In his Annual Address in 2014, 
President Putin explained the Western sanctions were an attempt to undermine 
and weaken Russia’s economic growth.192 During the GA debate in September 
2015, for instance, Vladimir Putin remarked that the sanctions imposed against 
Russia are illegal as they circumvent the UN Charter and because they are not 
based on a Security Council decision.193  
 58. Based on the above, we can deduce that when developing countries 
claim that UCM are contrary to international law, they are criticizing the fact 
that a minority of powerful States is undermining the multilateral system they 
want to uphold and imposing a specific understanding of human rights norms. 
In this sense, coercion is invasive and amounts to intervention because it seeks 
to dictate how States should interpret or apply rules, or worse, uses these rules 
as a pretext to apply political pressure. In this way, coercion does not 
necessarily have to amount to an irresistible pressure. Based on this reasoning, 
it is submitted that the NAM countries understand “economic coercion” as the 
wrongful use of economic power, or advantage, in order to unilaterally impose 
a certain type of behaviour. In this sense, UCM as a means to enforce so-called 
community norms are perceived as an illegitimate intervention. 
 59. Nevertheless, while developing countries are critical of non-UN 
sanctions, this does not mean they automatically refrain from adopting such 
measures themselves. For example, in March 2017 Iran – an outspoken critic of 
                                                     
190  President of Russia, Executive order on applying certain special economic 
measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation 
(http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46404). These measures were 
adopted against the EU, the US and States that had aligned themselves with 
their policies. 
191  Russian Government Decision, Suspending the Russian-US Agreement on 
Cooperation in Nuclear- and Energy-Related Scientific Research and 
Development (5 October 2016) (http://government.ru/en/docs/24766/); 
Rosatom, Russia withdraws from US Nuclear Cooperation’ (12 October 2016) 
(http://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/industry-in-media/russia-
withdraws-from-us-nuclear-cooperation/); President of Russia, Draft law 
suspending the Russia-US Plutonium Management and Disposition 
Agreement submitted to the State Duma (3 October 2016) 
(http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53009). 
192 President Putin, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly  
(the Kremlin, Moscow, 4 December 2014) 
(http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173). 
193  Address by President Putin before the UNGA summit meeting, A/70/PV.13 
(28 September 2015), 26. 
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unilateral coercive measures – adopted sanctions against fifteen US companies 
for “supporting Israel by providing arms and equipment ‘for use against the 
Palestinians’”.194 Although this should be understood against the background 
of tense US-Iranian relations, it could also be indicative of the fact that 
developing States will be willing to adopt sanctions depending on the norm that 
is at stake. For instance, Iran’s measures could possibly be justified as a means 
to support the Palestinian cause and even Palestinians’ right to self-
determination.195 This further illustrates the importance of values in the context 
of UCM.   
V. Conclusion 
60. This paper’s starting point was Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy’s inquiry 
on whether the frequent adoption of UNGA resolutions is indicative of an 
emerging prohibition of UCM. Following an assessment of legal doctrine’s 
position on the legality of unilateral economic sanctions, we analysed the 
resolutions referred to by the Special Rapporteur in order to determine their 
legal value. From a strictly positivist perspective, we were unable to determine 
that the resolutions and the statements made by UN Member States possess 
normative value. In spite of frequent calls for the cessation of such practice, a 
prohibition of UCM has not crystalized. Nevertheless, the resolutions are 
indicative of a clear divide on the issue of economic coercion between 
developing and developed States; a divide that is responsible for the current 
uncertainty. 
 61. It would appear that this split is caused not only by a divide on the 
norms and values of each group, but also by two incompatible group identities. 
The first group of States believes that UCM are permissible because they are 
adopted in the service of higher values and seek to pressure States that do not 
comply with these values to change their behaviour. They believe they are 
allowed to do this because of their leadership role in the international 
                                                     
194  Maya Lester, USA and Iran impose sanctions on new people & entities 
European Sanctions, 28 March 2017, 
(https://europeansanctions.com/2017/03/28/iran-imposes-sanctions-on-15-
us-firms/). Iran has also adopted counter-sanctions against US firms, see 
Michael O’Kane, Iran imposes reciprocal sanctions on 9 US firms, European 
sanctions (24 May 2017) (https://europeansanctions.com/2017/05/24/iran-
imposes-reciprocal-sanctions-on-9-us-firms/). 
195  Another example is the 1973 oil embargo imposed by Arab States in order to 
pressure Israel into changing its policies towards Palestine. Recall also that 
developing States were in favor of sanctions against the Apartheid regime in 
South Africa.  
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community.196 The second group of States fears that its values will be overruled 
by such unilateral acts. Though it values human rights and democracy, it resents 
powerful States for using their economic advantage in order to enforce changes 
in conduct. Developing countries therefore turn to acts of solidarity and 
multilateral practices as a means of resistance. Nevertheless, if developed States 
continue to impose UCM that target States view as illegitimate, this could have 
the effect of encouraging developing States to go beyond adopting UNGA 
resolutions and bite back by adopting UCM, as illustrated by the Iranian 
counter-sanctions. 
 62. These conclusions recall the work of Jouannet, who has described “a 
phenomenon of resistance” emanating from governments in response to values 
that are perceived as imposed or hegemonic;197 as international law evolves 
“towards the universalization of certain legal values, which are perceived of as 
Western, some very lively cultural resistance [re-emerges]”. 198  This appears 
relevant for the debate on economic coercion that seems to be driven by 
cultural divisions. Consequently, if we are to overcome the legal stalemate then 
political resistance needs to be addressed.199 It is clear from the analysis that 
followed that UCM do not promote harmony between States but instead give 
rise to resistance, resentment and all the friction that follows; thus escalating 
disputes and increasing tensions. For instance, Prime Minister Medvedev’s 
assessment of US-Russia relations in January 2017 is particularly critical of the 
US sanctions negative effect on cooperation between the two States.200 
 63. Therefore, rather than trying to copy the vertical nature of national 
legal systems, enforcement measures should be adapted to the horizontal 
system it seeks to strengthen. 201  In this way, practices of enforcement of 
                                                     
196  One could even say that they are expected to do something, see Hirsch, above 
n.12, 113. 
197  Jouannet, above n.113, 391-392. 
198  Ibid 390. 
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ibid 392. 
200  Assessment of Russian-US relations by Dimitri Medvedev (19 January 2017), 
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201  See, e.g., XUE Hanqin, above n. 175, 96. 
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international law should aim at bringing States together and at convincing each 
member of the so-called international community to strive to meet the ideals 
that guide the international legal system. 202  As noted by Yee, “it is not 
intervention in the domestic affairs of a State […] to attempt to dialogue with 
or influence a government undergoing difficulties in order to induce it, without 
coercion or use of force, to conduct its affairs in a better way.”203  
 64. We therefore agree with Doxey, who argued that instead of 
sanctions: 
 
emphasis […] should be placed on developing ways and means of 
lessening tension, keeping lines of communication open and avoiding 
conflict between [States]. In the long run, this would be a more 
constructive approach to problem-solving than occasional resort to 
international “enforcement” which suffers from [limitations].204 
 
Although some are skeptical about the benefits of communication in order to 
lessen tensions,205 when the situation is at a deadlock this may push us to give 
serious consideration to the unlikeliest solutions.  
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 65. Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that in reaction to UCM, 
certain States have called for more emphasis to be placed on the means of 
peaceful settlement of disputes. 206  This idea is not entirely new: the ILC 
planned on including a chapter on the peaceful settlement of disputes in the 
DASR because it was concerned that countermeasures, a type of UCM, 207 
would aggravate international disputes. 208  Nevertheless, the chapter was 
ultimately abandoned, as at the time it seemed too unrealistic. That being said, 
if we sincerely aspire towards a fair international (legal) system, the question 
now is whether or not it would be realistic, or even tenable, to continue down 
the current path. 
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